Tools Invoke (HTTP)

OpenClaw’s Gateway exposes a simple HTTP endpoint for invoking a single tool directly. It is always enabled and uses Gateway auth plus tool policy, but unlike the OpenAI-compatible /v1/* surface, shared-secret bearer auth is not enough to use it.

POST /tools/invoke
Same port as the Gateway (WS + HTTP multiplex): http://<gateway-host>:<port>/tools/invoke

Default max payload size is 2 MB.

Authentication

Uses the Gateway auth configuration. Send a bearer token:

Authorization: Bearer <token>

Notes:

When gateway.auth.mode="token", use gateway.auth.token (or OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN).
When gateway.auth.mode="password", use gateway.auth.password (or OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD).
If gateway.auth.rateLimit is configured and too many auth failures occur, the endpoint returns 429 with Retry-After.

Security boundary (important)

Treat this endpoint as a full operator-access surface for the gateway instance.

HTTP bearer auth here is not a narrow per-user scope model.
A valid Gateway token/password for this endpoint should be treated like an owner/operator credential.
For shared-secret auth modes (token and password), the endpoint restores the normal full operator defaults even if the caller sends a narrower x-openclaw-scopes header.
Shared-secret auth also treats direct tool invokes on this endpoint as owner-sender turns.
Trusted identity-bearing HTTP modes (for example trusted proxy auth or gateway.auth.mode="none" on a private ingress) still honor the declared operator scopes on the request.
Keep this endpoint on loopback/tailnet/private ingress only; do not expose it directly to the public internet.

Auth matrix:

gateway.auth.mode="token" or "password" + Authorization: Bearer ...
- proves possession of the shared gateway operator secret
- ignores narrower x-openclaw-scopes
- restores the full default operator scope set
- treats direct tool invokes on this endpoint as owner-sender turns
trusted identity-bearing HTTP modes (for example trusted proxy auth, or gateway.auth.mode="none" on private ingress)
- authenticate some outer trusted identity or deployment boundary
- honor the declared x-openclaw-scopes header
- only get owner semantics when operator.admin is actually present in those declared scopes

Request body

{
  "tool": "sessions_list",
  "action": "json",
  "args": {},
  "sessionKey": "main",
  "dryRun": false
}

Fields:

tool (string, required): tool name to invoke.
action (string, optional): mapped into args if the tool schema supports action and the args payload omitted it.
args (object, optional): tool-specific arguments.
sessionKey (string, optional): target session key. If omitted or "main", the Gateway uses the configured main session key (honors session.mainKey and default agent, or global in global scope).
dryRun (boolean, optional): reserved for future use; currently ignored.

Policy + routing behavior

Tool availability is filtered through the same policy chain used by Gateway agents:

tools.profile / tools.byProvider.profile
tools.allow / tools.byProvider.allow
agents.<id>.tools.allow / agents.<id>.tools.byProvider.allow
group policies (if the session key maps to a group or channel)
subagent policy (when invoking with a subagent session key)

If a tool is not allowed by policy, the endpoint returns 404.

Important boundary notes:

Exec approvals are operator guardrails, not a separate authorization boundary for this HTTP endpoint. If a tool is reachable here via Gateway auth + tool policy, /tools/invoke does not add an extra per-call approval prompt.
Do not share Gateway bearer credentials with untrusted callers. If you need separation across trust boundaries, run separate gateways (and ideally separate OS users/hosts).

Gateway HTTP also applies a hard deny list by default (even if session policy allows the tool):

exec — direct command execution (RCE surface)
spawn — arbitrary child process creation (RCE surface)
shell — shell command execution (RCE surface)
fs_write — arbitrary file mutation on the host
fs_delete — arbitrary file deletion on the host
fs_move — arbitrary file move/rename on the host
apply_patch — patch application can rewrite arbitrary files
sessions_spawn — session orchestration; spawning agents remotely is RCE
sessions_send — cross-session message injection
cron — persistent automation control plane
gateway — gateway control plane; prevents reconfiguration via HTTP
nodes — node command relay can reach system.run on paired hosts
whatsapp_login — interactive setup requiring terminal QR scan; hangs on HTTP

You can customize this deny list via gateway.tools:

{
  gateway: {
    tools: {
      // Additional tools to block over HTTP /tools/invoke
      deny: ["browser"],
      // Remove tools from the default deny list
      allow: ["gateway"],
    },
  },
}

To help group policies resolve context, you can optionally set:

x-openclaw-message-channel: <channel> (example: slack, telegram)
x-openclaw-account-id: <accountId> (when multiple accounts exist)

Responses

200 → { ok: true, result }
400 → { ok: false, error: { type, message } } (invalid request or tool input error)
401 → unauthorized
429 → auth rate-limited (Retry-After set)
404 → tool not available (not found or not allowlisted)
405 → method not allowed
500 → { ok: false, error: { type, message } } (unexpected tool execution error; sanitized message)

Example

curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:18789/tools/invoke \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer secret' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "tool": "sessions_list",
    "action": "json",
    "args": {}
  }'

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