openclaw/src/agents/pi-embedded-runner/run/params.ts

128 lines
5.6 KiB
TypeScript

import type { ImageContent } from "@mariozechner/pi-ai";
import type { ReasoningLevel, ThinkLevel, VerboseLevel } from "../../../auto-reply/thinking.js";
import type { ReplyPayload } from "../../../auto-reply/types.js";
import type { AgentStreamParams } from "../../../commands/agent/types.js";
import type { OpenClawConfig } from "../../../config/config.js";
import type { enqueueCommand } from "../../../process/command-queue.js";
import type { InputProvenance } from "../../../sessions/input-provenance.js";
import type { ExecElevatedDefaults, ExecToolDefaults } from "../../bash-tools.js";
import type { BlockReplyPayload } from "../../pi-embedded-payloads.js";
import type { BlockReplyChunking, ToolResultFormat } from "../../pi-embedded-subscribe.js";
import type { SkillSnapshot } from "../../skills.js";
// Simplified tool definition for client-provided tools (OpenResponses hosted tools)
export type ClientToolDefinition = {
type: "function";
function: {
name: string;
description?: string;
parameters?: Record<string, unknown>;
};
};
export type RunEmbeddedPiAgentParams = {
sessionId: string;
sessionKey?: string;
agentId?: string;
messageChannel?: string;
messageProvider?: string;
agentAccountId?: string;
/** What initiated this agent run: "user", "heartbeat", "cron", or "memory". */
trigger?: string;
/** Relative workspace path that memory-triggered writes are allowed to append to. */
memoryFlushWritePath?: string;
/** Delivery target (e.g. telegram:group:123:topic:456) for topic/thread routing. */
messageTo?: string;
/** Thread/topic identifier for routing replies to the originating thread. */
messageThreadId?: string | number;
/** Group id for channel-level tool policy resolution. */
groupId?: string | null;
/** Group channel label (e.g. #general) for channel-level tool policy resolution. */
groupChannel?: string | null;
/** Group space label (e.g. guild/team id) for channel-level tool policy resolution. */
groupSpace?: string | null;
/** Parent session key for subagent policy inheritance. */
spawnedBy?: string | null;
senderId?: string | null;
senderName?: string | null;
senderUsername?: string | null;
senderE164?: string | null;
/** Whether the sender is an owner (required for owner-only tools). */
senderIsOwner?: boolean;
/** Current channel ID for auto-threading (Slack). */
currentChannelId?: string;
/** Current thread timestamp for auto-threading (Slack). */
currentThreadTs?: string;
/** Current inbound message id for action fallbacks (e.g. Telegram react). */
currentMessageId?: string | number;
/** Reply-to mode for Slack auto-threading. */
replyToMode?: "off" | "first" | "all";
/** Mutable ref to track if a reply was sent (for "first" mode). */
hasRepliedRef?: { value: boolean };
/** Require explicit message tool targets (no implicit last-route sends). */
requireExplicitMessageTarget?: boolean;
/** If true, omit the message tool from the tool list. */
disableMessageTool?: boolean;
sessionFile: string;
workspaceDir: string;
agentDir?: string;
config?: OpenClawConfig;
skillsSnapshot?: SkillSnapshot;
prompt: string;
images?: ImageContent[];
/** Optional client-provided tools (OpenResponses hosted tools). */
clientTools?: ClientToolDefinition[];
/** Disable built-in tools for this run (LLM-only mode). */
disableTools?: boolean;
provider?: string;
model?: string;
authProfileId?: string;
authProfileIdSource?: "auto" | "user";
thinkLevel?: ThinkLevel;
verboseLevel?: VerboseLevel;
reasoningLevel?: ReasoningLevel;
toolResultFormat?: ToolResultFormat;
/** If true, suppress tool error warning payloads for this run (including mutating tools). */
suppressToolErrorWarnings?: boolean;
/** Bootstrap context mode for workspace file injection. */
bootstrapContextMode?: "full" | "lightweight";
/** Run kind hint for context mode behavior. */
bootstrapContextRunKind?: "default" | "heartbeat" | "cron";
/** Seen bootstrap truncation warning signatures for this session (once mode dedupe). */
bootstrapPromptWarningSignaturesSeen?: string[];
/** Last shown bootstrap truncation warning signature for this session. */
bootstrapPromptWarningSignature?: string;
execOverrides?: Pick<ExecToolDefaults, "host" | "security" | "ask" | "node">;
bashElevated?: ExecElevatedDefaults;
timeoutMs: number;
runId: string;
abortSignal?: AbortSignal;
shouldEmitToolResult?: () => boolean;
shouldEmitToolOutput?: () => boolean;
onPartialReply?: (payload: { text?: string; mediaUrls?: string[] }) => void | Promise<void>;
onAssistantMessageStart?: () => void | Promise<void>;
onBlockReply?: (payload: BlockReplyPayload) => void | Promise<void>;
onBlockReplyFlush?: () => void | Promise<void>;
blockReplyBreak?: "text_end" | "message_end";
blockReplyChunking?: BlockReplyChunking;
onReasoningStream?: (payload: { text?: string; mediaUrls?: string[] }) => void | Promise<void>;
onReasoningEnd?: () => void | Promise<void>;
onToolResult?: (payload: ReplyPayload) => void | Promise<void>;
onAgentEvent?: (evt: { stream: string; data: Record<string, unknown> }) => void;
lane?: string;
enqueue?: typeof enqueueCommand;
extraSystemPrompt?: string;
inputProvenance?: InputProvenance;
streamParams?: AgentStreamParams;
ownerNumbers?: string[];
enforceFinalTag?: boolean;
/**
* Allow a single run attempt even when all auth profiles are in cooldown,
* but only for inferred transient cooldowns like `rate_limit` or `overloaded`.
*
* This is used by model fallback when trying sibling models on providers
* where transient service pressure is often model-scoped.
*/
allowTransientCooldownProbe?: boolean;
};