docs: fix oxfmt formatting in remote.md and THREAT-MODEL-ATLAS.md

This commit is contained in:
Vincent Koc 2026-03-31 14:36:49 +09:00
parent 9f0845137a
commit b970187379
2 changed files with 12 additions and 12 deletions

View File

@ -240,9 +240,9 @@ Stop the tunnel:
launchctl bootout gui/$UID/ai.openclaw.ssh-tunnel
```
| Config entry | What it does |
| ------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `LocalForward 18789 127.0.0.1:18789` | Forwards local port 18789 to remote port 18789 |
| `ssh -N` | SSH without executing remote commands (port-forwarding only) |
| `KeepAlive` | Automatically restarts the tunnel if it crashes |
| `RunAtLoad` | Starts the tunnel when the LaunchAgent loads at login |
| Config entry | What it does |
| ------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `LocalForward 18789 127.0.0.1:18789` | Forwards local port 18789 to remote port 18789 |
| `ssh -N` | SSH without executing remote commands (port-forwarding only) |
| `KeepAlive` | Automatically restarts the tunnel if it crashes |
| `RunAtLoad` | Starts the tunnel when the LaunchAgent loads at login |

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@ -177,15 +177,15 @@ Nothing is explicitly out of scope for this threat model.
#### T-ACCESS-001: Pairing Code Interception
| Attribute | Value |
| ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access |
| Attribute | Value |
| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access |
| **Description** | Attacker intercepts pairing code during pairing grace period (1h for DM channel pairing, 5m for node pairing) |
| **Attack Vector** | Shoulder surfing, network sniffing, social engineering |
| **Affected Components** | Device pairing system |
| **Current Mitigations** | 1h expiry (DM pairing) / 5m expiry (node pairing), codes sent via existing channel |
| **Residual Risk** | Medium - Grace period exploitable |
| **Recommendations** | Reduce grace period, add confirmation step |
| **Current Mitigations** | 1h expiry (DM pairing) / 5m expiry (node pairing), codes sent via existing channel |
| **Residual Risk** | Medium - Grace period exploitable |
| **Recommendations** | Reduce grace period, add confirmation step |
#### T-ACCESS-002: AllowFrom Spoofing